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“Full spectrum dominance”: Donald Rumsfeld, the Department 
of Defense, and US Irregular Warfare Strategy, 2001-08  
  
In June 2004, US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, wrote a paper for President Bush 
questioning whether the “war on terror” was the right name for the campaign against Islamist 
extremism that had been declared after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. “Are we fighting a ‘Global 
War on Terror’?” Rumsfeld asked, 
 
Or are we witnessing a ‘global civil war within the Muslim religion’ where a relatively 
small minority of radicals and extremists are trying to hijack the religion from the large 
majority of moderates? Or are we engaged in a ‘global insurgency’ against us by a 
minority of radical Muslims in the name of a fanatical ideology? Or is it a combination 
of the two?  
 
“The important point” he continued “is that what we face is an ideologically-based 
challenge.” Accordingly, “We should test the proposition as to whether it might be accurate 
and useful to define our problem a new way—to declare it as a ‘civil war within Islam’ 
and/or a ‘global ideological insurgency.’
1   
 
Ultimately Rumsfeld failed to convince the President that the name ‘war on terror’ should be 
changed. However, his use of the phrase ‘global insurgency’ is striking. As Secretary of 
Defense, Rumsfeld has been overwhelmingly associated with the notion of a Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA)—or Military Transformation as it came to be known under George 
W. Bush—which was devoted to high-technology conventional warfare and seemed to come 
at the expense of capabilities in, and even recognition of, other forms of unconventional or 
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Irregular Warfare (IW) such as insurgency and counterinsurgency, psychological warfare and 
asymmetric attacks.2 The perception of Rumsfeld’s dedication to RMA-style warfare at the 
expense of IW was bolstered by his unwillingness or inability—and that of most other senior 
policy makers in the Bush administration—to admit the existence of an insurgency in Iraq 
from 2003-04 onwards, and his resistance to implementing a counterinsurgency strategy 
there.3 
 
The insurgency in Iraq catalyzed a new focus in the US Army on counterinsurgency 
(COIN)—one variant of irregular warfare—which culminated in a new Army Field Manual 
on COIN in December 2006; the first such publication on counterinsurgency since the 
Vietnam era.4 Piqued by the humiliating defeat in South East Asia, the US Army had turned 
away from counterinsurgency and virtually excised it from the military curriculum, instead 
opting to focus on its preferred paradigm of war: conventional inter-state conflict.5 Faced 
with an insurgency in Iraq, and with no existing doctrine on COIN or guidance from senior 
policy-makers, it was left to a small group of very well-placed Army officers and COIN 
policy enthusiasts, such as General David Petraeus, Lieutenants John Nagl, and David 
Kilcullen, and the retired General, Jack Keane to make the case for counterinsurgency in Iraq 
and eventually to develop the new Army Field Manual on COIN (FM 3-24) to guide a policy 
that became increasingly attractive to the Bush administration as the situation in Iraq 
deteriorated.6 As the insurgency gathered pace, policymaking in Washington became 
dysfunctional with neither the President nor the Secretary of Defense able to forge consensus 
on the way forward. This policymaking deadlock provided the political space for enthusiastic 
COIN advocates, such as Petreaus and the team involved in writing the new COIN Field 
Manual, to exercise decisive influence on US strategy in Iraq.7 
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Since the publication of FM 3-24 in December 2006 and the subsequent implementation of 
these ideas in Iraq, the academic and professional study of counterinsurgency has proliferated 
with the post-2006 period seen as the highpoint of what one scholar calls “the new 
counterinsurgency era” in US foreign and defence policy with Iraq the principal catalyst for 
this change.8 The widespread consensus is that the so-called “COIN-dinistas”, led by 
Petraeus, waged a ‘bottom-up’ revolution in which, for the first time since Vietnam, COIN 
was put back on the Army’s agenda and became the basis for a new—and, it is claimed by its 
architects and supporters, successful—strategy in Iraq from 2007 onwards. The focus on 
Petraeus and his associates has shed important light on changes in the doctrine and practice of 
the US Army specifically, as well as the formation of US strategy in Iraq especially from 
January 2007 onwards when the troop ‘surge’ began and a COIN approach was implemented. 
However, there is a broader context, beyond Petreaus, beyond the Army and beyond Iraq, 
which significantly aids our understanding of the development of US capabilities in irregular 
warfare in the 21st century, and which has thus far been neglected. This article argues that 
civilian policymakers at the Department of Defense—especially Rumsfeld—played an 
important role in encouraging the DoD and other US government agencies to embrace 
irregular forms of warfare organizationally, politically, and doctrinally from 2001 onwards. 
This may at first seem counterintuitive. Rumsfeld has been widely criticised for his initial 
failure to recognise the insurgency in Iraq and his stubbornness when it came to changing 
course there. As Jeffrey Michaels argues, however, it is uncertain whether this was because 
he “either genuinely believed the United States was not involved in fighting a guerrilla war or 
felt that to make this admission, even in closed political and military circles, somehow 
reflected a personal failing that in turn could have jeopardized his bureaucratic position and 
authority.”9 At the time of the invasion, Rumsfeld viewed Iraq as a conventional state-based 
threat, thought a new regime would emerge organically, and that the US could and should 
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leave as quickly as possible. As the insurgency developed, however, the conflict became 
‘unconventional’ and Rumsfeld’s predictions and assumptions about how a relatively low 
number of troops would suffice to stabilise the country were proven wrong. Admitting this (if 
indeed he did believe a guerrilla war was taking place) could be a major political 
embarrassment. Nevertheless, until further documentation is released, we cannot know for 
certain why Rumsfeld was hostile to COIN in Iraq. What we do know, however, is that he 
was a strong supporter of other variants of irregular warfare elsewhere in the war on terror—
such as the Philippines, Africa, and Georgia—especially Foreign Internal Defense (FID), in 
which US troops would train and advise indigenous security forces and undertake the other 
non-kinetic elements of an IW campaign including psychological, social, economic, and 
political measures. Rumsfeld saw IW as an integral part of national defense in the future 
because he believed that irregular and hybrid wars would be the wars of the 21st century, and 
even before 9/11 he worried about America’s vulnerability to asymmetric and other non-
conventional forms of attack. This article argues that Rumsfeld’s dismissal of COIN in Iraq 
did not, therefore, equate to an indiscriminate rejection of the concept of COIN; it was a 
rejection of counterinsurgency specifically in Iraq, but not necessarily elsewhere because 
Rumsfeld believed that in an age of globalisation security threats were just as likely to be 
irregular as conventional. The earliest roots of US irregular warfare strategy therefore lie in 
the pre-9/11 period, though the terrorist attacks most certainly catalysed its development. 
Rumsfeld did not, at this early stage, have a sophisticated and well developed conception of 
what constituted IW but he and others were interpreting the war on terror as a conflict in 
which the hearts and minds of the world’s Muslims were the battle ground, and advocating 
approaches that were clearly in line with, and indeed, anticipated what would later be 
encompassed in the official definition of IW in 2007. Thus the IW approach did not come 
fully formed in 2001-02, but its roots lie in this period. The ultimate objective was “full 
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spectrum dominance”: preponderance across the entire spectrum of warfare from 
conventional conflicts through to irregular war.10 In other words, the turn towards irregular 
warfare was designed to ensure continued US global military preeminence; it was not purely 
a response to the circumstances of Iraq. This commitment to IW is a significant material 
legacy of Rumsfeld’s tenure and the Bush administration and continues into the Obama years.  
 
Rumsfeld’s Agenda 
In his first meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 2001, Rumsfeld  “asked for their 
thoughts on what ‘transforming’ could mean for the Department.”11 The new Secretary was 
committed to Military Transformation, as was the new President.12 Yet Rumsfeld realised 
that conventional superiority alone did not immunize America from security challenges. In 
his memoir he recalled that he had “often noted that the United States then [in 2001] faced no 
peers with respect to conventional forces—armies, navies, and air forces—and, as a result, 
future threats would likely lie elsewhere.”13 Rumsfeld’s June 2001 Terms of Reference for 
the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for the review to consider US 
vulnerabilities in an age of “open borders and open societ[ies]”14. Rumsfeld questioned 
whether it was still appropriate for the military to maintain the two conventional major 
simultaneous war posture of the post-Cold War years and said that the QDR team would be 
looking at alternatives.15 One significant change would definitely be the use of “capabilities-
based” planning models. Since the Cold War, when the most likely security threat to the 
United States was deemed to be the Soviet Union, the Pentagon had relied on “threat-based” 
planning models; in other words, force posture would be dictated by the most likely threat. 
Now, however, threats were more difficult to identify and might not be recognizable in 
conventional terms. “Contending with uncertainty must be a centerpiece of US defense 
planning”, said the QDR Terms of Reference.16 Accordingly, Rumsfeld wanted the military 
to develop “a portfolio of key military capabilities” that would enable it to confront a 
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spectrum of threats rather than planning only for one particular type of conventional 
adversary.17   
 
The ensuing QRD report, released in late September 2001, but written almost entirely before 
9/11, reflected and expanded upon these themes in quite striking ways. The report 
acknowledged that a planning system that focused almost exclusively on conventional state-
based threats was out of date because the nature of armed conflict was changing “in ways that 
render military forces and doctrines of great powers obsolescent.”18 In a globalised world  
 
[I]t is not enough to plan for large conventional wars in distant theaters. Instead, the 
United States must identify the capabilities required to deter and defeat adversaries 
who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their 
objectives. 
 
This would be facilitated by the switch to capabilities-based planning which would “den[y] 
asymmetric advantages to adversaries.”19 The two major regional war construct was being 
modified: the Pentagon was “not abandoning planning for two conflicts to planning for less 
than two… [but] changing the concept altogether by planning for victory across the spectrum 
of possible conflict.”20 This was necessary because, in the future, the US was likely to be 
challenged “by adversaries who possess a wide range of capabilities, including asymmetric 
approaches to warfare.”21 This was far from being an articulation or endorsement of irregular 
warfare, but it showed that the Pentagon was beginning to think about non-traditional security 
threats in a different way and now recognised that not all challenges would take a 
conventional form. It was clear that, for Rumsfeld at least, the extant military did not have the 
capabilities required for ‘full spectrum dominance.’ 
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The content of the QDR was a reflection of Rumsfeld’s priorities. A report on the QDR 
process written by the General Accounting Office, and based on discussions with anonymous 
officials from the DoD, repeatedly noted the “top-down leadership for the [QDR] process.” 
The Secretary of Defense and other key officials “actively participated in planning and 
implementing the 2001 QDR”, even attending a five day meeting to discuss threats, 
capabilities, and force structure.22 In addition: 
 
The Secretary was directly involved in reviewing and revising drafts of the QDR report. 
One high-ranking OSD official stated that he had not seen as much interaction among 
the senior leadership in any of the three prior defense planning studies he had 
participated in. The broad consensus of officials we spoke with across DOD is that the 
QDR report represents the Secretary’s thinking and vision.23  
 
In May 2002, Rumsfeld reflected further on these themes in an article in Foreign Affairs. 
America’s unparalleled conventional power meant that “it makes little sense for potential 
adversaries to try to compete with us directly…. [T]hey will likely seek to challenge us 
asymmetrically by looking for vulnerabilities and trying to exploit them.” Reflecting the 
classic IW emphasis on a whole-of-government approach to conflict, Rumsfeld argued that 
since conventional military power could not counter every threat  
 
…wars in the twenty-first century will increasingly require all elements of national 
power: economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and both overt 
and covert military operations. Clausewitz said, “War is the continuation of politics by 
other means.” In this century, more of those means may not be military.24 
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Moreover, at a relatively early stage of what had become known as the ‘war on terror’ 
Rumsfeld had become convinced that this conflict was an example of the kind of irregular 
war the US would increasingly face. In July 2002, he asked the head of US Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM), General Charles R. Holland, to work on a plan to make 
SOCOM the lead unified command for planning and synchronizing the global war on terror.25 
SOCOM’s core activities included Unconventional Warfare, Psychological Operations, 
Foreign Internal Defense, Special Reconnaissance and Civil Affairs—ideal for leading an 
irregular war. The elevation of SOCOM was counter-cultural and the conventional 
commands opposed giving it synchronizing authority—meaning it could issue orders to other 
commands regarding global counter-terrorism operations. Nevertheless, the 2004 Unified 
Command Plan designated the SOCOM commander as “the lead combatant commander for 
planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist 
networks in coordination with combatant commanders.”26 This assuredly did not mean that 
the Pentagon was abandoning its commitment to conventional military superiority; instead it 
sought to complement conventional strengths with irregular warfare capabilities so that it 
could fight and win across the full spectrum of conflict.  
 
New developments in national strategy and organisation 
Although in relation to Iraq it suited the administration to emphasise the concept of state-
sponsorship of terrorism, elsewhere the nature of the terrorist threat in a globalised world was 
defined in a more meaningful and sophisticated way as a transnational, often stateless 
phenomenon. The required response incorporated some (although not all) of the key elements 
of IW. These included: identifying and treating the perceived root causes of conflict, 
expanding the scope and importance of stability and reconstruction operations, developing 
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train and equip programs for US partners, winning the ideological war so as to win the 
allegiance of indigenous populations, and ultimately using all instruments of national power 
to achieve victory. These precepts had been key elements of IW campaigns historically, such 
as the British COIN campaign in Malaya and the French in Algeria, both of which were 
hugely influential in the writing of FM 3-24, and were also integral to Washington’s Foreign 
Internal Defense (FID) campaigns in Central America during the 1980s.27 This article will 
now examine the new definition of terrorism and the key elements of IW, described above, 
that were deemed appropriate ways to respond to it. 
 
The nature of the terrorist threat 
Although state-sponsorship of terrorism was invoked in relation to Iraq, in parallel an 
alternative, more sophisticated analysis of terrorism was also emerging; one which 
interpreted the phenomena as an unconventional kind of threat for which conventional 
military power would not be an appropriate response. The September 2002 National Security 
Strategy—the result of an interagency process led by National Security Advisor, Condoleezza 
Rice—hinted at this: 
 
Enemies past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. 
Now shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering… Terrorists 
are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies 
against us.28 
 
The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism was more explicit, defining terrorism 
as a phenomenon that was not just state-sponsored but also transnational. The terrorist 
challenge had had “changed considerably over the past decade” it said; state-sponsorship had 
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declined and in some cases stopped completely. Terrorism itself had evolved as a result of 
“dramatic improvements in the ease of transnational communication, commerce and travel.” 
Now the terrorist group was described as “a flexible, transnational structure, enabled by 
modern technology and characterized by loose interconnectivity both within and between 
groups.” Such networks would act in asymmetric ways “avoiding our strengths and 
exploiting our vulnerabilities.”29  
 
In May 2004, the National Military Strategy of the United States of America identified a 
range of potential adversaries. As well as emanating from states, security challenges could 
come from “non-state actors, including terrorist networks, international criminal 
organizations and illegal armed groups that menace stability and security.”30 These groups 
posed four kinds of security challenge: traditional (“posed by states employing recognized 
military capabilities and forces”), irregular (“com[ing] from those employing 
‘unconventional’ methods to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents”), 
catastrophic (“involv[ing] the acquisition possession, and use of WMD or methods producing 
WMD-like effects”), or disruptive (“from adversaries who develop and use breakthrough 
technologies to negate current U.S. advantages in key operational domains”).31 This meant 
that two out of the four possible challenges US forces were now to prepare for involved an 
adversary negating US conventional strength (irregular and disruptive challenges), while a 
third (catastrophic) involved technology that could be used by either states or, just as likely, 
by non-state actors. The 2004 Strategy reaffirmed the purpose of a capabilities-based 
approach to planning: “[t]he goal is full spectrum dominance—the ability to control any 
situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations”.32 
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By 2006, the concept of state-sponsorship of terrorism had been relegated to a tertiary 
concern. The updated National Strategy for Combating Terrorism did not mention state-
sponsorship until page 4 and it was absent from the ‘Overview’ of the strategy on page 1. 
Islamist terrorist movements were “not controlled by any single individual, group or state” 
but were unified by “a common set of ideas about the nature and destiny of the world”.33 This 
was also reflected in the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism published 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 2006, a document designed to implement the 
priorities laid out by policy makers in the National Security Strategy. It described Al Qaeda 
as “a complex and ever-shifting network of networks”: 
 
There is no monolithic enemy network with a single set of goals and objectives… the 
primary enemy is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and 
individuals—and their state and non-state supporters, which have in common that they 
exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends.34 
 
Thus the characterisation of terrorism now reflected the impact of globalisation on 
international security.  
 
The nature of the response 
With the nature of the most salient contemporary threat established—networked, 
transnational terrorism—the administration made some effort to understand its root causes 
and to craft a response that employed unconventional techniques, including some of the key 
elements of irregular warfare.  
 
a.) Root causes: failed states 
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In his classic reflection on counterinsurgency warfare, the French Army colonel, David 
Galula, who served in Algeria during the war of independence, noted that “the insurgent 
cannot seriously embark on an insurgency unless he has a well-grounded cause with which to 
attract supporters among the population. A cause… is his sole asset at the beginning.”35 
Responding to an insurgency therefore required an examination of its root causes. 
Understanding this was essential for the development of appropriate political, military, 
economic, and informational policies. In 2002, the Bush administration began to think about 
the root causes of terrorism. Despite the President’s crude public rhetoric about “evil-doers”, 
some effort was made to identify root causes of terrorism beyond malevolent individuals. The 
chief underlying cause was considered to be weak and failed states and the power vacuum 
that resulted. The 2002 National Security Strategy claimed that in the twenty-first century the 
United States was “threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones”. Poverty, 
weak institutions and corruption were phenomena that “can make weak states vulnerable to 
terrorist networks”.36 This was explained in greater detail in the February 2003 National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT): 
 
At the base, underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and 
ethnic strife create opportunities for terrorists to exploit. Some of these conditions are 
real and some manufactured. Terrorists use these conditions to justify their actions and 
expand their support. The belief that terror is a legitimate means to address such 
conditions and effect political change is a fundamental problem enabling terrorism to 
develop and grow.37 
 
Diminishing these underlying conditions would be a key objective in the fight against 
terrorism. The United States would have to reach out to “the poor and destitute masses” 
	 13	
living with poverty, deprivation, social disenfranchisement, and unresolved political and 
regional disputes if it was to diminish the appeal of terrorism. Strengthening failing states 
would tackle the circumstances that bred terrorism.38  
 
The NSCT pledged to work with international and regional partners to ensure effective 
governance over ungoverned territory.39 Where once the problem had been active state 
sponsorship of terrorism, now it appeared to be lack of state influence: ungoverned, rather 
than governed, spaces. The notion that failing states were central to the problem of terrorism 
remained central to the US analysis of terrorism, though it was a problematic and, ultimately, 
unconvincing diagnosis. The lead 9/11 hijacker and head of the ‘Hamburg cell’, Mohammed 
Atta, planned the attacks while studying architecture in Germany, while the London 
underground bombings of July 2005 were carried out by four UK residents. Moreover, while 
state failure was often the result of terrorism and insurgency, it was not necessarily the cause 
of it. Often the absence of strong central governmental authority provided only a facilitating 
context rather than a compelling cause. The administration had little to say about what 
specific grievances might fuel such violence and the popular resonance some of those causes 
might have in the wider population.40 In sum, its interpretation of terrorism was insufficiently 
political. Nevertheless, the emphasis on weak states as the root cause of terrorism remained. 
 
b.) Stability operations  
The generic focus on weak and failing states as a cause of terrorism led to the development of 
a response that elevated the importance of stability operations, another key element of IW. 
During the 1990s, the US Army had increasingly been called upon to conduct what were 
awkwardly referred to as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).41 As David Rose 
has demonstrated, the army’s ‘Lessons Learned’ process resulted in a surprising amount of 
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change to army doctrine as a result of deployments in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, which did 
not fit the traditional model of conventional warfare.42 Reflecting this, the Army released an 
updated Operations manual in June 2001, which added ‘stability’ and ‘support’ to the stages 
of warfare for the first time.43  
 
With the inauguration of the war on terror, stability operations quickly became integral to US 
counterterrorism operations and, in many ways, anticipated the further development and 
formalisation of doctrine and strategy in this area. From 2002 onwards, the Bush 
administration implemented foreign internal defense programmes (FID—another variant of 
irregular warfare) in the Philippines, under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom—the 
Philippines, and across Africa as Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara. The objective 
was to prevent the emergence of terrorism in the weak states of the Sahel and Sahara regions, 
and to diminish the appeal of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the southern Philippines. Full 
discussion of these operations is beyond the scope of the article, but the campaigns in both 
Africa and the Philippines included stability operations as integral components. In the 
Philippines, for example, SOF worked with the Filipino Department of Social Welfare and 
Development in 2002 to help fund the construction and repair of infrastructure including 
building roads, water wells, an airport strip, a port, and bridges on the island of Basilan.44  
Across Africa, USAID, the State Department, and the DoD worked together from 2003 
onwards to provide comprehensive counterterrorism programmes that included extensive 
stability operations and community outreach work as well as security training.45 Stability 
operations were therefore integral to the operations of the war on terror from the outset. 
 
Strategy documents soon began to catch up. The Pentagon’s May 2004 National Military 
Strategy, designed to speak to the priorities set down by civilian policy makers in the 2002 
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NSS, stated that in conflict scenarios “winning decisively” would require synchronizing 
major combat operations with stability operations and conducting the two simultaneously if 
necessary. Stability operations were a force multiplier because they “render other instruments 
of national power more effective and set the conditions for long-term regional stability and 
sustainable development.” Echoing Rumsfeld’s 2002 call for the utilization of “all elements 
of national power”, the 2004 strategy envisaged stability operations as part of a whole-of-
government effort in which military post-conflict operations would be integrated with 
diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, and information efforts.46  
 
The culmination of this process came in November 2005 with the issuance of Department of 
Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, 
and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. This landmark directive made SSTR operations “a 
core U.S. military mission… [that] shall be given priority comparable to combat operations”. 
Effective immediately, the directive stated that SSTR operations “be explicitly addressed and 
integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, 
exercises, material, personnel, facilities, and planning.” The immediate goal of SSTR 
operations was classic IW: “to provide the local populace with security, restore essential 
services, and meet humanitarian needs.” The long-term goal was to create indigenous 
capacity for this. Ultimately, this would “help establish order that advances U.S. interests and 
values.”47 The list of activities that came under the rubric of SSTR operations was expansive 
and included “rebuild[ing] indigenous institutions”, “reviv[ing] or rebuild[ing] the private 
sector”, “develop[ing] representative governmental institutions”, “ensuring security”, 
“promoting bottom-up economic activity”, “rebuilding infrastructure”, and “building 
indigenous capacity for such tasks”. This was particularly important because many stability 
operations were best performed by indigenous or US civilian professionals; “nevertheless, 
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U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain 
order when civilians cannot do so.”48 In essence, the military would be prepared to nation-
build. This was a far cry from Bush’s rejection of using the military for nation building 
during the Presidential campaign in 2000, and from the high-tech focus of the RMA.   
 
To be sure, DoDD 3000.05 was not solely the result of the Pentagon’s recognition of the 
changing nature of warfare in the 21st century; the directive was also catalysed by the post-
war chaos in Iraq. The recommendation that SSTR be a core military competency originated 
with the Defense Science Board’s 2004 Summer Study on the Transition to and from 
Hostilities.49 This study was requested on 23 January 2004, not by Petreaus or his allies in the 
military, but by three senior civilian Pentagon officials (Michael Wynne, Undersecretary for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Douglas Feith, Undersecretary for Policy; and 
Stephen Cambone, Undersecretary for Intelligence) largely on the basis of the situation at the 
time in Iraq.50 After the Defense Science Board briefed Rumsfeld on its findings, he ordered 
his staff to draft a directive to put the report’s recommendations into effect.51 The lawlessness 
in Iraq therefore played a crucial role in encouraging senior policy makers to think about 
what more the military could do to win the peace. Ultimately, however, the new SSTR 
directive built on existing trends and operations in the war on terror and confirmed that senior 
civilians in the DoD were interested in how to better manage non-conventional conflict 
scenarios. 
 
The new emphasis on stability operations at the DoD reflected initiatives already being 
implemented by State and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). In April 
2004, the National Security Council authorised Secretary of State, Colin Powell, to create the 
Office of the Co-ordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). This office was 
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initially composed of approximately seventy-five employees coming from the Departments of 
State, Defense, Justice, Labor, the Treasury, the Army, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the 
CIA. Its four main tasks were: watchfulness and early alert, planning, lessons learned and 
best practices, and crisis response strategy.52 Nine days after the issuance of Directive 
3000.05, Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) regarding the 
management of interagency reconstruction and stabilisation operations.53 This directive 
instructed the Secretary of State to “co-ordinate and lead integrated United States 
Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, 
to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”54 Thus the State 
Department would lead the development of “a strong civilian response capability” for 
stabilisation and reconstruction activities.55 Stability operations would embody “all elements 
of national power.”56  
 
However, S/CRS was underfunded by Congress. In response, in 2006, S/CRS and the 
Pentagon established a partnership on stability operations, which was authorised under 
Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act, and became known as ‘Section 
1207’ funding. Under 1207, the DoD could transfer up to $100m per year in defence articles, 
services, training or other support to the State Department for use in reconstruction and 
stability operations. 1207 was introduced in response to requests from Rumsfeld and Powell’s 
successor, Rice. State benefitted because S/CRS had suffered from Congressional under-
funding since its establishment in 2004; for the DoD the arrangement allowed it to take 
advantage of State’s civilian expertise in post-conflict reconstruction at a time when the 
Pentagon was still developing its own capabilities. From FY 2006-10, Section 1207 funded 
$445.2m worth of projects in twenty-three countries.57 It was the realization of interagency 
collaboration on stability operations.   
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Rice built on this further with her “transformational diplomacy” (TD) inititive.58 She defined 
TD as “work[ing] with our many partners around the world, to build and sustain democratic 
and well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct 
themselves responsibly.”59 To this end, Rice established a new position, the Director of 
Foreign Assistance (DFA), who would be in charge of all State Department and USAID 
foreign assistance programmes and serve as director of USAID. Assistance programmes 
would now consider five criteria, which reflected some of the themes of DoDD 3000.05: 
peace and security; governing justly and democratically; investing in people; economic 
development; and humanitarian assistance.60 For Rice the ultimate purpose was security:  
 
Our Reconstruction and Stabilization Office must be able to help a failed state to 
exercise responsible sovereignty and to prevent its territory from becoming a source of 
global instability, as Afghanistan was in 2001.61 
 
As part of this effort, a new course on TD was added to the curriculum at the Foreign Service 
Institute. Diplomats would now be required to be expert in two regions, fluent in two 
languages, and advancement to senior positions would be linked to service in hardship posts. 
From 2006-07, 200 diplomatic posts were repositioned from Europe and the US to Asia and 
Africa.62 
 
This work also overlapped with the core missions of USAID, which were re-defined by its 
director, Andrew Natsios, in 2004 “to better align them with the foreign policy needs of this 
new era.” Testifying to Congress in 2005, Natsios reflected on the whole-of-government 
effort to promote stabilisation operations: “the whole spectrum of our foreign policy 
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establishment had to be engaged and many of its programs re-designed” he claimed. The five 
new core missions of USAID were: the promotion of transformational development 
(including building indigenous capacity for health care, education, and social and economic 
progress); strengthening fragile states; providing humanitarian relief; supporting geopolitical 
interests (“through development work in countries of high strategic importance”); and 
addressing global issues (including combating criminal activities such as money laundering 
and trafficking in persons and narcotics).63 By 2008, USAID had developed its own official 
policy guidance for co-operation with the DoD on stability operations, which were described 
as “a key element of USAID’s development mission”.64 By 2010, USAID’s Civil-Military 
operations included activities on the ground on Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, Yemen, 
Northern Uganda, Colombia, Kosovo, the countries of the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism 
Initiative, Djibouti, and co-operation with the Medical Civil Assistance Program.65 In 
addition, military representatives from the geographic combatant commands and the Special 
Operations Command were seconded to USAID headquarters to provide day-to-day 
coordination and management.66 To be sure there was still scope for further development of 
these activities, and in some cases more funding was required; nevertheless serious efforts to 
promote an interagency approach to stability operations in weak and failing states were 
underway at least two years before the application of a COIN strategy to Iraq.67 
 
c.) Train and Equip programmes 
Training and equipping indigenous security forces was another key element of IW that came 
to the fore in US national strategy in the aftermath of 9/11. The 2002 National Security 
Strategy pledged that “[w]here governments find the fight against terrorism beyond their 
capabilities, we will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help we and our 
allies can provide.” Building military capacity in partner nations was an integral part of the 
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Bush administration’s response to global terrorism from late 2001 onwards, particularly in 
Africa, the Philippines, and in Georgia. 68 In practice, this meant training and equipping 
indigenous military forces to undertake counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations 
as well as border and maritime security and, in some cases, civil affairs projects of their own. 
Africa was a particular region of concern in this respect. The NSS stated that the US would 
help “strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build indigenous capacity to secure porous 
borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens 
for terrorists.”69 The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism called for “enabling 
weak states” to “help them acquire the necessary capabilities to fight terrorism through a 
variety of means.”70 The administration’s FID campaigns in Africa—covering the central belt 
of the country from the Horn in the East through to the Gulf of Guinea in the West—and in 
the southern separatist region of the Philippines, which both began in 2002, included major 
train and equip components. In addition, a smaller programme, the Georgia Train and Equip 
Programme, began in February 2002 to help the Georgian authorities assert control over the 
lawless Pankisi Gorge region where, it was rumoured, Islamist extremists were sheltered.71 
These programmes were endorsed by Combatant Commanders. In September 2004, General 
James L. Jones, head of US European Command (subsequently Barack Obama’s National 
Security Advisor) described the train and equip activities in Europe and Africa as “programs 
that require small investments, but that yield enormous dividends.”72 The perceived success 
of these programmes led to an expansion of the DoD’s train and equip capability. In 2004, 
Rumsfeld requested and received Congressional authority to provide $40m per year in 
Special Operations Forces support to foreign forces, irregular forces, and groups or 
individuals that could assist with missions in the war on terror. This was known as Section 
1208 authority  (because the request appeared in that section of the FY 05 National Defense 
Authorization Act).73 Section 1208 was limited to SOF, however. In early 2005, the DoD 
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attempted to gain Congressional authority for a broader global train and equip programme, 
which would give it blanket permission—with the concurrence of State—to train and equip 
foreign military forces and maritime security forces anywhere outside of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. (There were separate appropriations for those countries.) This request, worth 
$200m per year, was made in section 1206 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization 
Act and subsequently became known as Section 1206 funding.74 This marked a significant 
change to the existing arrangements for training and equipping foreign security forces: under 
the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, the State Department was responsible for overseeing 
foreign military assistance even when it was delivered by DoD. Section 1206 was led by the 
DoD and would require only the concurrence of State. The funds were quickly put into effect. 
By 2008, according to the Defense Security Co-operation Agency, Section 1206 had “rapidly 
become the gold standard for interagency co-operation” and was considered by Combatant 
Commanders to be the “single most important tool to shape the environment and counter 
terrorism outside Iraq and Afghanistan.” Annual demand for the funds exceeded availability 
every year.75 In fiscal years 2006-10, $1.3B in 1206 funding was spent across thirty-four 
countries.76  So effective were these train and equip programmes (or at least this was the 
perception) that they were singled out for further consideration and expansion in the February 
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. In May that year, a QDR Execution Roadmap on 
Building Partnership Capacity was published, which sought to enhance the integration of the 
Pentagon’s work with its interagency partners at home and its international partners abroad:  
 
Whenever advisable, the United States will work with or through others: enabling allied 
and partner capabilities, building their capacity… The United States must work with 
international partners in less familiar areas of the world to reduce the drivers of 
instability, prevent terrorist attacks or disrupt their networks, to deny sanctuary to 
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terrorists anywhere in the world, to separate terrorists from host populations and 
ultimately defeat them.77 
 
Bilateral and multilateral partnerships were thus an indispensible component of the war on 
terror. In 2007, the Pentagon attempted to make its Section 1206 authority permanent and 
increase the funding to $750m per year.78 However, members of Congress were sceptical of 
what Rep. Ike Skelton, Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, said “appears to be 
the migration of State Department activities to the Defense Department.” Ultimately 
Congress agreed only to continue the status quo, meaning the 1206 funding would continue 
to require annual approval.79  
 
d.) Winning hearts and minds 
If building partner capacity was a key tenet of irregular warfare, so was the administration’s 
focus on ideological narratives and ‘winning hearts and minds’. In the Terms of Reference 
for the 2001 QDR, Rumsfeld had called for Information Operations (IO) to become a core 
capability of future forces.80 The 2001 QDR listed “conducting effective information 
operations” as one of six critical operational goals for the DoD.81 The 2002 National Security 
Strategy described the war on terror as a “war of ideas” in which the hearts and minds of the 
world’s Muslims were the battleground.82 Then in November 2003 the Information 
Operations Roadmap, which resulted from the 2001 QDR, instructed the DoD to transform its 
existing I.O. capability “into a core military competency on a par with air, ground, maritime, 
and special operations.”83 IO was essential to both conventional and unconventional warfare 
and the Roadmap directed SOCOM to establish a Joint Psychological Support Element 
(JPSE) to “coordinate Combatant Command programs and products with the Joint Staff and 
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O[ffice] [of the] S[ecretary of] D[efense] to provide rapidly-produced, commercial-quality 
PSYOP product prototypes consistent with overall U.S. Government themes and messages.”  
The ultimate objective was to conduct “full spectrum information operations.”84 Thus the 
strategic importance of information operations had been recognised by policy makers by 
2003. Moreover, Public Affairs operations were already an important component of 
operations in the peripheral theatres of the war on terror. Public Affairs releases from 
EUCOM provided vignettes of European Command’s (EUCOM) civil affairs operations in 
Africa, from the delivery of food supplies to the construction of community centres and 
repairing of schools, and even support for democracy and economic stability efforts.85 
Military Information Support Teams were provided to US embassies in the countries 
affiliated with Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans Sahara.86 An online news portal—
magharebia.com—was designed to counter extremist views in the Maghreb region was 
established by EUCOM.87 In the Philippines, Military Information Support Teams provided 
newspaper adverts, handbills, posters, radio broadcasts, and, most uniquely, a ten part graphic 
novel series.88 
 
At cabinet level, Rumsfeld was the key supporter of IO. The National Defense Strategy of 
March 2005 included a section on “Countering ideological support for terrorism” which was 
incorporated at the behest of Rumsfeld and his senior advisors over the mild objections of 
Powell and Rice. The section called for an information campaign incorporating all 
instruments of national power to “delegitimate” the terrorists’ narrative, support “models of 
moderation” in the Muslim world, and reinforce the message the war on terrorism “is not a 
war against Islam, but…a civil war within Islam.”  Victory would come “only when the 
ideological motivation for the terrorists’ activities has been discredited.”89 By 2006, these 
ideas about IO had reached maturation. SOCOM’s Capstone Concept described the 
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counterterrorist struggle as “a war of conflicting ideas, ideologies, social values and human 
rights” that required “the tools of influence, information, and intelligence”, while the 2006 
QDR stressed that victory over terrorism would only come “when the enemy’s extremist 
ideologies are discredited in the eyes of their host populations and tacit supporters”—a 
classic IW precept.90  
 
Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 
The most comprehensive description of the nature of the war on terror and the irregular 
challenges of the future came in the QDR of February 2006. This document, Rumsfeld stated 
in his foreword, “reflects a process of change that has gathered momentum since the release 
of its predecessor QDR in 2001”. The 2006 QDR described the war on terror as “the long 
war… that is irregular in nature.”91 Fighting it would require “irregular warfare activities 
including long-duration unconventional warfare, counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency, and 
military support for stabilization and reconstruction efforts.”92 The new strategic environment 
required preparation for conventional war against nation states and the prevention of peer-
competitors but also preparation for “multiple irregular, asymmetric operations” against 
decentralized network threats and non-state actors.93 While the Bush administration was 
committed to exploiting the supposed RMA to enhance US conventional military dominance, 
this was not to be at the expense of preparing for other types of conflict.   
 
Like its 2001 predecessor, the 2006 QDR also reflected Rumsfeld’s priorities. The Terms of 
Reference issued by him in March 2005 identified four focus areas: defeating terrorist 
networks, defending the homeland, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, 
and preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.94 According 
to Ryan Henry, then the incoming Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the 2006 
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QDR was based on the premise that “The military conflicts of the future are not likely to 
consist of traditional state-on-state symmetric warfare. We have to invest in capabilities to 
deal with the unexpected and the asymmetric.” This meant focusing on irregular, traditional, 
catastrophic, and disruptive challenges, as first outlined in the 2005 National Military 
Strategy for the War on Terror. It was essential, Henry wrote, to “open up our intellectual 
aperture and to be able to appreciate the spectrum of challenges facing us.”95 Henry’s line 
manager, the Undersecretary for Policy—Doug Feith until August 2005, then Eric 
Edelman—had the lead role in conducting the 2006 QDR. There was also an interagency 
component: in Spring 2005, senior Pentagon leaders held meetings on the key focus areas 
with partners from other US government agencies and with international allies too in order to 
identify potential threats and required capabilities.96 According to the General Accounting 
Office, one of the strengths of the process was that “key senior DoD leaders maintained 
sustained involvement throughout the review. The Deputy Secretary of Defense—Paul 
Wolfowitz until May 2005 and Gordon England thereafter—co-chaired a senior level review 
group with the Vice Chair of the JCS, which met several times a week to review the work of 
the QDR study teams and provide guidance to ensure the QDR’s strategic priorities were 
being addressed.97 
 
The QDR also instituted eight follow-up execution roadmaps to provide concrete guidance 
and deadlines for the implementation of key objectives. These included roadmaps on 
Building Partnership Capacity, Irregular Warfare, and Strategic Communications.98 The IW 
roadmap was designed to facilitate the full implementation of DoDD 3000.05, as well as “the 
decisions made during the 2006 QDR regarding the capabilities and capacity of the [DoD] to 
conduct and support protracted IW.” This was essential because IW had become “the warfare 
of choice for adversaries who attempt to erode our national power and break our will through 
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protracted conflict.” In the future “IW, of which the Global War on Terrorism is a part, will 
likely be the dominant form of conflict.”99  
 
The Strategic Communications Roadmap built on Rumsfeld’s elevation of IO as a core 
military capability. This area was a particular interest of his. In July 2005 he wrote a memo to 
Rice, Vice President Cheney, and other senior officials asserting that “We need a plan to 
mobilize moderate Muslims—both in the US and around the world” and emphasised the 
importance of an “appropriate message, tone, style” and the “means of delivering the 
message.” “This is a national security issue and a vital part of winning this war”, he wrote.100 
However, the 2006 QDR had identified “significant gaps” in the DoD’s ability to conduct IO. 
The Strategic Communications roadmap was designed to provide “a plan of action and 
milestones” that would lead to “a culture that recognizes the value of communication and 
integrates communication considerations into policy development, operational planning, 
execution, and assessment to advance national interests.”101 This work resonated across the 
administration; in June 2007 the first ever National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and 
Strategic Communication was released. “The US is engaged in an international struggle of 
ideas and ideologies” the document stated; “To effectively wage this struggle, public 
diplomacy must be treated—along with defense, homeland security, and intelligence—as a 
national security priority in terms of resources.”102 
 
Conclusions: The Post-Rumsfeld Era 
At Rumsfeld’s departure ceremony in December 2006, the President claimed, with some 
justification, that “there has been more profound change at the Department of Defense over 
the past six years since the Department’s creation in the late 1940s.”103 This change was not 
just doctrinal; the FID campaigns in Africa and the Philippines, the use of Section 1207 funds 
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to finance stability operations overseen by the S/CRS office, the widespread use of Section 
1206 funds for train and equip programmes, the global diplomatic repositioning, and the 
USAID-DoD co-operation on the ground demonstrated that a real strategic shift had begun. 
 
Moreover, the turn towards IW that was supported by Rumsfeld and other senior policy 
makers in the DoD and across the US government has largely survived not just Rumsfeld’s 
departure from office but also the Bush administration. Rumsfeld’s successor, Robert Gates, 
publically supported the continued development of IW capabilities in September 2008 while 
discussing the premises of the new National Defense Strategy: “If I could describe the new 
[Strategy] in one word it would be ‘balance’; balance between the range of capabilities to 
prevail in persistent asymmetric or irregular conflict and sustaining our conventional and 
strategic force superiority as a hedge against rising powers”—a precise echo of the 2006 
QDR and its antecedents in 2004-05. “We must be ready for both kinds of conflict and fund 
the capabilities to do both” Gates stated.104  In September 2007 the first Joint Operating 
Concept on Irregular Warfare was published. For the first time, a definition of IW was 
formalized as 
 
a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over 
the relevant populations. IW favours indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it 
may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode and 
adversary’s power, influence, and will.105 
 
This was complemented by DoD Directive 3000.07, on Irregular Warfare, released in 
December 2008, which asserted that IW “is as strategically important as traditional warfare” 
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and that the DoD must have the capabilities and capacity to be “as effective in IW as it is in 
traditional warfare.”106  
 
To a great extent, these priorities have continued into the Obama era too. Obama’s National 
Security Strategy of May 2010 repeatedly emphasized the integration of “all elements of 
American power”:  
 
We are improving the integration of skills and capabilities within our military and 
civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly… We will 
continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, 
counterinsurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security 
threats, while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military 
operations.107 
 
The Obama administration did diminish the impact of DoDD 3000.05 in January 2012 with 
the publication of a new national security report driven by “the national security imperative 
of deficit reduction” in an age of austerity.108 One consequence was that “US forces will no 
longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations” (emphasis added). 
However, this did not mean the end of military involvement in these activities. The DoD 
“will still nevertheless be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability 
operations if required” and would also utilise “non-military means and military-to-military 
co-operation to address and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to 
stability operations.”109 In other words, large-scale IW, like the campaign in Iraq, was 
undesirable but smaller programmes like the FID campaigns that had lasted a decade in the 
Philippines and across Africa were acceptable—and, indeed, those programmes are ongoing 
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at the time of writing. The new strategy recognised the full spectrum of conflict: the number 
one Primary Mission for the armed forces in the age of austerity was “Counterterrorism and 
Irregular Warfare.”110  Moreover, the development of interagency programmes and 
capabilities meant that downplaying the military’s role in non-kinetic operations would not 
necessarily mean an end to IW campaigns. 
 
The reason these changes endured was because they had support from top tier policy makers 
from the beginning and because they transcended the Army and indeed the Pentagon to 
become part of America’s national strategy, not just its military strategy. The openness of a 
key figure like Rumsfeld to unconventional methods of warfare was based on a belief that 
contemporary globalisation had created new types of transnational networked adversaries—
such as Islamist terrorism—and Washington was now just as likely to face asymmetric and 
irregular challenges as conventional ones.  For the United States to maintain its position as 
the world’s preeminent power meant preparing to fight across the full spectrum of conflict; to 
win decisively against any and every type of potential adversary, not just a conventional one.  
“Full spectrum dominance” was an objective that transcended Iraq and continues after the US 
withdrawal.  
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